Ten years since the Iraq invasion, many more years with Iranian threat inflation

James Fallows thinks about the ten year anniversary of the Iraq invasion. He says he'd like to hear from the liberal war hawks and what they've learned.  I don't quite fit that category - not always a liberal for one thing, and was undecided rather than a supporter of the war.  I did believe the WMD stories, and that getting rid of an entrenched dictator could be enormously valuable (I've lived in two dictatorships and had a taste of them).

On the latter issue of overthrowing dictatorship, I think I've learned a distaste for putting American boots on the ground absent clear popular support, which is why I opposed the Afghanistan war expansion but supported doing what we did in Libya, and doing something and not the nothing we've done so far in Syria.

On the former issue of WMDs, Fallows makes an excellent point about "threat inflation", that threats are almost always portrayed as far worse and more imminent than is actually true, and gives some examples.  I've been thinking about Iran's nuclear threat, and it turns out in 2011, Christian Science Monitor had a good description of that over time.  Here's a condensed version:

1992: Israeli parliamentarian Benjamin Netanyahu tells his colleagues that Iran is 3 to 5 years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon – and that the threat had to be "uprooted by an international front headed by the US."

1992: Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres tells French TV that Iran was set to have nuclear warheads by 1999. "Iran is the greatest threat and greatest problem in the Middle East," Peres warned, "because it seeks the nuclear option while holding a highly dangerous stance of extreme religious militancy."

1995: The New York Times conveys the fears of senior US and Israeli officials that "Iran is much closer to producing nuclear weapons than previously thought" – about five years away – and that Iran’s nuclear bomb is “at the top of the list” of dangers in the coming decade.

1998: The same week, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reports to Congress that Iran could build an intercontinental ballistic missile – one that could hit the US – within five years. The CIA gave a timeframe of 12 years.

I think we should forever rename Netanyahu as Bibi "Iran Will Have Nukes in 1997" Netanyahu, and never again take seriously anything he says.  As Kevin Drum says, we're also far better off to discount significantly any claimed threat elsewhere.


UPDATE:  thought I'd add that the new Republican willingness to cut the defense budget may be complicating budget negotiations, but otherwise it's a good thing and might lead to less adventurism.

Perception and reality of counterinsurgency war

This is what a chickenhawk perceives counterinsurgency warfare to be (first three minutes is all you need):



Counterinsurgency war:

As Glenn Greenwald said, the issue here isn't the soldiers who did the shooting, it's about running a counterinsurgency war in a foreign country.

A question for Bob Woodward

If this new, supersecret counterinsurgency technique is so game-changing in Iraq, why hasn't it been used in Afghanistan, where things have been deteriorating for over a year?

Maybe I'm too hard on Woodward, but he seems to be the David Broder of confidential sources. Broder takes the conventional wisdom on any subject and pronounces it like an amazing revelation, or possibly something he claims to have heard from a local yokel somewhere. Woodward's books on the Iraq war does the same thing with confidential sources whose information just mirrors conventional perception of whether the war's going well or badly, whether Bush is a good or bad leader, etc.

The utility of either journalist is limited. Maybe a slight edge for Woodward in providing sources for historical analysis, long after the fact.

Hope versus belief in holy war

I will agree there's been a slightly unfair attack on Sarah Palin regarding the "holy war" issue. The full quote:

“Pray for our military men and women who are striving to do what is right. Also for this country, that our leaders, our national leaders are sending them out on a task that is from God. That’s what we have to make sure that we’re praying for, that there is a plan and that that plan is God’s plan.”

People from a non-religious background might miss that praying that the war is God's plan is different from announcing that it's God's plan. What the full-throated Palin defenders then miss, though, is that the gap between hoping something is God's plan and believing it to be God's plan is likely pretty small. A believer who thinks God's approval or disapproval is discernable and extends to virtually every action would presumably believe that the Iraq war has God's support, or the believer would oppose the war. So Palin might not be making the assertion as a matter of faith, but to the best of her judgment it is a holy war.

On the other hand, her Lincoln quote-mining appears to be one of the many fake Lincoln quotes.

They pay a price for being right about Iraq and the economy

Via Ezra, Jim Henley offers his musings on why he was right about Iraq five years ago. Henley could've helped out by linking to exactly when he gave the right arguments, but I scrolled through much of his March 2003 archive and he appears to be right for the right reasons (cost of occupation mainly, a little about doubts over WMDs).

I was thinking of writing my own little piece about how and why I went wrong and sat on the fence over Iraq in 2003, but linking to Henley is better. It's interesting that people who were wrong continue to get featured prominently, and people like Chris Hitchens who insanely insist they're not wrong also get prominence, but the people who were right are ignored. Dean Baker has made a similar point about the experts warning against the housing bubble and how they're still being ignored.

Anyway, I'm adding Henley to my blogroll, as the least I can do.

Thomas Ricks degrades his reputation on Fresh Air

Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks has tried to make up for his mediocre-if-better-than-the-Times reporting in the runup to the Iraq War with his book Fiasco, criticizing US policy in Iraq after the invasion. He never apologizes for his past failures in his current book, however.

Now he's on to new failures. On the NPR show Fresh Air, Ricks says of the "General Betray Us?" ad that he was "appalled," that the ad was "unfair and not accurate," and that his long personal knowledge of Petraeus as a "good soldier" meant the ad was wrong. He said the criticisms consisted of personal attacks, which is where he goes wrong.

The Move-On ad's headline was juvenile and counterproductive, but morally justifiable based on the ad's actual content. Ricks never once responds to the iron-clad proof that Petraeus has in the past sugar-coated his description of Iraq prospects for purposes of political advantage. Doing that yet again in the life-and-death context of Iraq can appropriately be described as betrayal.

Ricks is engaged in what I'd call a reverse ad-hominem - saying Petraeus is a good guy, therefore the criticisms about his previous statements are inaccurate. Going deeper, I think Ricks thinks Petraeus' policies might have worked if applied from the beginning, and that his policies still have a slight chance of working, and so criticisms shouldn't be allowed. That's bad journalism, and the bad journalism of Ricks and people like him is why we're in the fiasco that we face today.

UPDATE: For a contrary view of the Move On ad, see this baloney analysis in the Washington Post. Personally I don't think an advocacy ad consisting of about 100 words is obligated to discuss opposing views and opposing evidence so long as it doesn't imply no such views exist. But what do I know.

Belated August 2007 Iraq casualties

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 2.84 (the vast majority are Americans, but not including Iraqis)

Previous averages
July 2007: 2.87
June 2007: 3.6
Last year, August 2006: 2.13.

Overall daily average to date is 2.49. Total US dead as of today: 3781.
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Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 76.

Previous military/police fatality rates
July 2007: 232
June 2007: 196
Last year, August 2006: 233.
Total Iraqi military dead: 7448.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are significant undercounts.

--------

Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1598

Previous
July 2007: 1458
June 2007: 1146
Last year, August 2006: 2733.
To-date civilian partial total (stats begin only in March 2005): 37441.

Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends, especially in the short term.

Comments: Now twelve months in a row with American casualties above average; no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average for American/non-Iraqi foreign fatality rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.29 deaths daily.

As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as early 2006, and three times worse than in 2005. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

Seven months have passed since the troop escalation began, with no indication in these statistics that it has accomplished anything, except possibly as a contributor to higher US military casualties. These civilian statistics do not corroborate US military claims for a decrease in violence in areas covered by the surge - either these stats are completely useless, the US stats are completely useless, or the violence moved away from Baghdad and into other areas.

A new way that Iraq's a mess

From Talking Points Memo: Iraq doesn't control or fund its intelligence service - the CIA does, through a crony of Ayad Allawi, who's been proposed to replace Iraq's current Prime Minister through a legal or "extra-legal" process. Iraq has had to create a second intelligence service so it actually has some control of that one.

I don't blame the US for infiltrating the Iraqi government - it's what I hope we're doing with Pakistan. I just hope we're clear on the true loyalties of the people we're paying, and don't have all our infiltrators located in a single basket. That Iraq is forced to tolerate this level of US control is crazy though - it reminds me of how the Sandinistas have their own private army outside of Nicaraguan governmental control.

I like this comment too, posted at TPM:

So....what are the odds that the big fee Allawi is paying to GOP lobbyists is actually cash that came directly from INIS and indirectly from the CIA?

Your tax dollars at work.

In other Iraq news, the uneven security improvements appear to be a result of Sunni Iraqis anticipating a near-term withdrawal of American troops rather than a result of the surge.

Mitt Romney is no Teddy Roosevelt

Romney is catching heat for saying his sons' volunteer work on his campaign is more or less the equivalent of military service in Iraq. I think Republicans will just have to continue to avoid any comparison to another proponent of military adventures, Teddy Roosevelt:

Teddy said he'd never ask anyone to take a risk he wouldn't take himself. As a middle-aged man he volunteered for the Spanish-American War and served under dangerous conditions. He told his 3 sons that he'd disown them if they didn't serve in World War I, and one of them died. He begged his political enemy Woodrow Wilson for a military commission in the war as well, but was denied.

July 2007 Iraq casualties, and NY Times screws up

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 2.87 (the vast majority are Americans, but not including Iraqis)

Previous averages
June 2007: 3.6
May 2007: 4.26
Last year, July 2006: 1.48.

Overall daily average to date is 2.48. Total US dead as of today: 3659.
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Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 232.

Previous military/police fatality rates
June 2007: 196
May 2007: 198
Last year, July 2006: 132.
Total Iraqi military dead: 7333.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are significant undercounts.

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Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1441

Previous
June 2007: 1146
May 2007: 1782
Last year, July 2006: 1063.
To-date civilian partial total (stats begin only in March 2005): 35,597.

Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends.

Comments: Now eleven months in a row with American casualties above average, no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average for American/non-Iraqi foreign fatality rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.29 deaths daily.

As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as a year ago, and three times worse than in 2005. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

Six months have passed since the troop escalation began, with no indication in these statistics that it has accomplished anything, except possibly as a contributor to higher US military casualties, with no trend yet for Iraqi military and police.

Three of the last four months have had especially high British casualty rates, so we'll have to see if that continues.

The NY Times screw up is here:

BAGHDAD, July 31 — The death of a marine in western Iraq brought the American military death toll to 74 so far in July, on course to be the lowest monthly figure this year....

It's a terrible reporting job. First, the death toll is significantly worse than the four-year average, so playing it as good news is ridiculous. Second, there's no point in trying to draw a trend based on a single month. I've seen right-wing bloggers do it countless times - take one month of slight improvement from an overall worsening trend, claim victory, and ignore the stats for months more until the process can repeat. The Times isn't keeping good company.

From Panama to Iraq, via Dick C. and Mike O'H.

A missing piece of understanding why we screwed up in Iraq is because the people planning it compared it to the Panama invasion. I could probably prove it and end this post right now by pointing out a certain Dick C. was Secretary of Defense during the Panama invasion, but there's more to it.

Start with Grenada: 7,000 US troops attack a small island nation of 100,000 people with 2,000 regular and foreign (Cuban) soldiers. The US wins with 19 US soldiers killed, we take over the island, and it's hard to argue the place isn't better because of it.

Repeat with Panama: 28,000 troops invade a country of 2 million defended by 16,000 soldiers. The US wins with 24 dead, installs a new leader, and again it's hard to argue the country isn't better off.

Then, enter the establishment's favorite defense liberal, Michael O'Hanlon, with this gem:

Counting Casualties: How many people would die in an Iraqi War?
By Michael O'Hanlon
Posted Wednesday, Sept. 25, 2002, at 5:37 PM ET

A central question about the war in Iraq is the likely cost in terms of casualties. Many Americans who would support an invasion on the assumption of 250 dead might feel very differently if our losses numbered 10 times as many. Unfortunately, such predictions have proven notoriously inaccurate in the past....

Is it possible to make better predictions this time around? It may be, but not with a single number or narrow range....

What do past cases tell us about how a future war conducted largely in the streets of Baghdad might play out....

Simply scaling the results of Panama for the size of the Iraqi military leads to an estimate of about 2,000 Americans killed, more than 10,000 dead Iraqi military personnel, and tens of thousands of dead Iraqi citizens. If, however, the only forces that fight hard are the elite—somewhat more than 100,000 Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and palace guard forces—extrapolation from the Panama case suggests that losses on all sides might be only one-fourth as great. Such an outcome is plausible. Indeed, U.S. war plans appear to envision targeting only these elite forces, at least at first, and trying to convince the regular conscript army to change sides or sit out the war....

One major wild card remains: the likely consequences of any Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction....Iraq could also increase casualty levels of U.S. or coalition forces by using WMD against them, particularly its thousands of chemical-filled artillery shells and rockets. But doing so would probably increase casualties by no more than 10 to 20 percent, given historical precedent in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war....

The United States and coalition partners would win any future war to overthrow Saddam Hussein in a rapid and decisive fashion. This will not be another Vietnam or another Korea. But casualties could be significantly greater on all sides than in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The best analogy for what such combat is likely to involve is not Desert Storm, but the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama—and on a much larger scale. There is a very real possibility that American deaths could exceed 1,000 in number, and several thousand deaths cannot be ruled out. To count on easy victory, as many American proponents of war seem to do, is not only unsupported by the available evidence and by the methodologies of combat prediction. It's also an irresponsible basis on which to plan military strategy in any future war against Saddam Hussein.

(Emphasis added.)

O'Hanlon appears to put the 50% probability level as significantly less than 1000 US dead, and I think we've passed on to a casualty level O'Hanlon thought could be ruled out.

I'll leave a full analysis of why Panama wasn't a good analogy for Iraq to someone else - the minor issues of say, the lack of a religious conflict or that Panama had an elected president and authentic political leadership ready to step in and take power suggest themselves as potential distinctions.

The point is that the range and quality of expertise went from Dick Cheney on the right to this "liberal" military expert whose influence is still felt. I doubt the Cheney people missed the same lesson they also thought they learned in Panama. Can we get some new experts, finally?

As for the anti-war left, though, they're probably not all that interested in this lesson either, as it does point to some uncomfortable examples where invasion by Republican presidents seemed to work okay, whatever the true motivations involved.

Contrasting worst case scenarios for Iraq and climate change

(Following up on a previous post about worst case scenarios...)

The people who find the worst case scenarios to be persuasive reasons for action on climate change are likely the opposite ones who would use the same reasoning to argue for a continued military presence in Iraq.

Despite thinking we should get out of Iraq, I also agree that potentially, things could get much worse there after we leave. So why leave?

One argument would be that we're just putting off the inevitable - we're going to leave sooner or later, and even if the worst case scenario occurs, all we do by staying is add a lot of death and destruction in the meantime. Not a bad argument, but the counter is that staying can buy time to find a solution.

Another argument is that things can get worse with our troops there. I wouldn't disagree, but I don't expect it would get as bad as in some full-out genocide/civil war.

A better argument to me is that for the US and the rest of the world - basically for everyone except the Iraqis - right now is the worst case scenario. I don't think an Al Qaeda takeover of Iraq is a credible scenario, and even if it was, the current cost of 1,000 dead Americans and $120 billion annually exceeds the damage rate that Al Qaeda could do to us. As for the rest of the world, having the US in Iraq only creates problem. Only for the Iraqis could the situation get much worse.

The best argument though is that you shouldn't just look at the worst case scenario. I think Iraqis have a shot at things not getting worse but rather staying at the same awful level they're at right now, and after a decade or so, slowly improve and follow Lebanon's trajectory. I don't see any other path for improvement. For the rest of us, we're clearly better off if the US gets out. And the Iraqis want us out. It's time to leave.

I lost the climate change thread here, but I think a similar reasoning applies - making a decision solely based on worst case scenarios is a bad idea. The medium case scenario for climate change still describes a crisis, though, providing plenty of reasons to take action.

June 2007 Iraq casualties

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 3.6 (nearly all Americans, and excluding Iraqis)

Previous averages
May 2007: 4.26
April 2007: 3.9
Last year, June 2006: 2.55.

Overall daily average to date is 2.47. Total US dead as of today: 3580.
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Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 196.

Previous military/police fatality rates

May 2007: 198
April 2007: 300
Last year, June 2006: 132.
Total Iraqi military dead: 7086.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are signficant undercounts.

--------

Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1146

Previous
May 2007: 1782
April 2007: 1521
Last year, June 2006: 738.
To-date civilian subtotal, (stats begin only in March 2005): 34,030.

Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends.

Comments: Now ten months in a row with American casualties above average, no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average American/foreign rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.29 deaths daily.

As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as a year ago, and three times worse than in 2005. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

Five months have passed since the troop escalation began, with no indication in these statistics that it has accomplished anything, except possibly as a contributor to higher US military casualties, with no trend yet for Iraqi military and police.

General Petraeus' record of being nonpolitical and accurate

Dick Polman has the goods, quoting what Petraeus wrote in the Washington Post six weeks before the 2004 presidential election:


I see tangible progress. Iraqi security elements are being rebuilt from the ground up. The institutions that oversee them are being reestablished from the top down. And Iraqi leaders are stepping forward, leading their country and their security forces courageously…There are reasons for optimism…Training is on track and increasing in capacity. Infrastructure is being repaired…Progress has also been made in police training…Considerable progress is also being made in the reconstruction and refurbishing of infrastructure for Iraq’s security forces…Iraq’s security forces are developing steadily and they are in the fight. Momentum has gathered in recent months. With strong Iraqi leaders out front and with continued coalition – and now NATO – support, this trend will continue.


That'll give us an idea of how much we can trust what we hear from him this September.

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Think Progress also discovered this issue.

Making mandatory national service a choice

My idea for national service is to give young people a choice:

Alternative #1. Before they turn 25, begin serving for a shorter period of time than Alternative 2 would require. I don't know how long; it would depend on the need and could be somewhere between 12 to 24 months.

or

Alternative #2. Do no mandatory service before 25, but if the national need arises at any age before their retirement, based on a proclaimed national emergency like Bush's War on Terror, those who did not serve earlier and are chosen by lottery will be required to serve twice as long a time period as Alternative 1. Almost no one who failed to serve earlier would be exempt from the lottery.

That's the basic idea, although improvements are possible - you can adjust the incentives so that right number of people sign up for military versus nonmilitary national service, or sign up right away versus taking a chance on the lottery. I recognize that you probably can't make a worthwhile modern soldier out of someone for a useful period out of a total period of 12 months, but special support roles that require less training could be developed.

The key issue is that almost no one who skips the initial service gets out of the lottery. No, a sedentary 55 year-old won't be fighting door to door under this system, but he could very well help with paperwork in Baghdad or Kabul and take his chances along with everyone else. And no exemptions at all based on the person being more valuable doing whatever she happens to be doing currently when her number's called. This is a new social compact we're talking about, and economic efficiency arguments get trumped.

The economic efficiency of not fighting Bush's Iraq War, or ending it much sooner than will otherwise happen, is pretty obvious and a likely benefit if the general and older population had a much closer connection to people being sent involuntarily to Iraq.

May 2007 Iraq casualties

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 4.26 (nearly all Americans, and excluding Iraqis)

Previous averages
April 2007: 3.9
March 2007: 2.65
Last year, May 2006: 2.55.

Overall daily average to date is 2.46. Total US dead as of today: 3495.
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Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 198.

Previous military/police fatality rates

April 2006: 300
March 2007: 215
Last year, May 2006: 150.
Total Iraqi military dead: 6903.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are signficant undercounts.

--------
Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1782

Previous
April 2006: 1521
March 2007: 1674
Last year, April 2006: 969.
To-date civilian total, begining in March 2005: 33,034.

Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends.

Comments: Now nine months in a row with American casualties above average, no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.29 deaths daily.

As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as a year ago, and three times worse than in 2005. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

Four months have passed since the troop escalation began, with no indication in these statistics that it has accomplished anything, except possibly to show higher US military and Iraqi civilian casualties, with no trend yet for Iraqi military and police.

What the Democrats should have done about Iraq war funding

I think the Democratic Congress made a mistake in mostly giving in to Bush on Iraq war funding. I also think John Edwards is wrong, although less so, in saying the Democrats should've kept sending Bush still more bills with timetables in them for him to veto.

Instead, the Democrats should've done what they had suggested earlier, sending bills with short-term funding of two or three months, and take Bush on in the constitutional crisis he threatened. I think this is similar to what Edwards would've done, except that it would leave the Democrats in a stronger position.

Bush said if he got a short-term funding bill he would veto that, too. Fine. The Democrats can say "we want a timetable to get out, but Bush won't allow it and we don't have the votes to override, so instead we're willing to fund the effort for a short time period and see what happens afterwards. We're simply not going to fund an open-ended war." Bush can try and argue that Democrats aren't funding the troops, but each time the Democrats can just send him a new short-term funding bill. I expect he'll veto it each time, and the military will come closer to a point, some time in mid-summer, when it won't have funding for the war.

Then Bush has a choice, and the Democrats a response to either choice he takes. Bush can obey the law, and begin a precipitous withdrawal, blaming Democrats for the inevitable chaos that he says will follow. Immediately, the Democrats respond by passing a new funding bill dedicating money only to an orderly withdrawal from Iraq over the next four to six months, while allowing to stay (and fund) behind whatever non-combat forces that the Democrats choose to allow. I have trouble believing that Bush would veto this bill as well, leaving M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles in Iraq - and if he did, it's the one veto that would get overridden.

Or Bush will take the unitary executive theory to its extreme, saying as long as Congress has not rescinded the 2002 Iraq military force authorizations, he doesn't need Congressional approval and can spend money without it. While there is some US Civil War legal authority for very limited spending in this situation for a limited time, no precedent would justify an open-ended war.

So then Bush provokes a constitutional crisis. Democrats respond by suing to force him to stop, and the courts either refuse to rule on the issue as a political question or fail to resolve the issue before January 2009. This isn't a Bush victory, unless you call unmasking a dictatorship a victory for the dictator. Instead the war will be seen as all that much more illegal, Bush will be that much more isolated, and Republican congressmen and Republican presidential candidates would have to announce whether they support the interpretation of the president as a dictator.

I think it would have brought us closer to ending the war without having to wait for a Democratic president, without the Democrats getting blamed.

I'll acknowledge that the actual Democratic approach has created benchmarks. Failing to meet these benchmarks will have no real repercussions, but the Democrats will use the failure to call again for a withdrawal. Still, that's not enough to give Bush another year of authorization for catastrophic failure.

April 2007 Iraq casualties

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 3.9 (nearly all Americans, and excluding Iraqis)

Previous averages
March 2007: 2.65
February 2007: 3.0

Last year, April 2006: 2.73.

Overall daily average to date is 2.41. Total US dead as of today: 3355.


Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 158.

Previous military/police fatality rates
March 2007: 215
February 2007: 150

Last year, April 2006: 201.
Total Iraqi military dead: 6551.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are signficant undercounts.


Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1521

Previous
March 2007: 1674
February 2007: 1381

Last year, April 2006: 808.

To-date civilian total, begining in March 2005: 28,583. Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends.

Comments: Now eight months in a row with American casualties above average, no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.29 deaths daily.

As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as a year ago, and three times worse than in 2005. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

Three months have passed since the troop escalation began, with no indication in these statistics that it has accomplished anything.

While I'm quoting Copernicus...

...something else from De Revolutionibus:

I debated with myself for a long time whether to publish the volume which I wrote to prove the earth's motion or rather to follow the example of the Pythagoreans and certain others, who used to transmit philosophy's secrets only to kinsmen and friends.... And they did so... [not] because they were in some way jealous about their teachings...on the contrary, they wanted the very beautiful thoughts attained by great men of deep devotion not to be ridiculed by those who are reluctant to exert themselves vigorously in any literary pursuit....When I weighed these considerations, the scorn which I had reason to fear on account of the novelty and unconventionality of my opinion almost induced me to abandon completely the work which I had undertaken.

But while I hesitated for a long time and even resisted, my friends drew me back....

Come back, Lancet Iraq mortality study authors!

March 2007 Iraq casualties

Avg. daily Coalition fatality rate during the last month: 2.65 (nearly all Americans, and excluding Iraqis)

Previous averages
February 2007: 3.0
January 2007: 2.77

Last year, March 2006: 1.06.

Overall daily average to date is 2.38. Total US dead as of today: 3257.


Iraqi monthly military and police fatalities: 215.

Previous military/police fatality rates
February 2007: 150
January 2007: 91

Last year, March 2006: 191.
Total Iraqi military dead: 6395.

Note that I've seen media reports suggesting the Iraqi military casualty figures are signficant undercounts.


Iraqi monthly civilian fatalities: 1674

Previous
February 2007: 1381
January 2007: 1,711

Last year, March 2006: 901.

To-date civilian total, begining in March 2005: 27,086. Note that the civilian numbers are far less accurate than others (most likely to be greatly underestimated, or even ridiculously underestimated), but could still be useful in determining trends.

Comments: Now seven months in a row with American casualties above average, no prior bad stretch lasted longer than three months. The overall average rate continues to move up, from a low of 2.9 deaths daily.

Iraqi military fatality rates may be creeping up, but we need another month or two to establish a trend. As before, civilian casualties remain terrible. The rate seems to hover around a level that is nearly twice as bad as a year ago. Neither we nor the Iraqis realized how good we had it back in 2005.

UPDATE: It's worth mentioning that these stats give no indication that the troop escalation in Iraq has accomplished anything. Two months is a little early to draw a conclusion, but there's nothing encouraging so far in the data.

UPDATE 2: Maybe not the best post for a comedy link, but still: Bush Refuses To Set Timetable For Withdrawal Of Head From White House Banister